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Abstract
Through the lens of game theory, cooperation is frequently considered an un-
sustainable strategy: if an entire population is cooperating, each individual can
increase its overall fitness by choosing not to cooperate, thereby still receiving
all the benefit of its cooperating neighbors while no longer expending its own
energy. Observable cooperation in naturally-occurring public goods games is
consequently of great interest, as such systems offer insight into both the emer-
gence and sustainability of cooperation. Here we consider a population that
obeys a public goods game on a network of discrete regions (that we call nests),
between any two of which individuals are free to migrate. We construct a system
of piecewise-smooth ordinary differential equations that couple the within-nest
population dynamics and the between-nest migratory dynamics. Through a
combination of analytical and numerical methods, we show that if the work-
ers within the population migrate sufficiently fast relative to the cheaters, the
network loses stability first through a Hopf bifurcation, then a torus bifurca-
tion, after which one or more nests collapse. Our results indicate that fast
moving cheaters can act to stabilize worker-cheater coexistence within network
that would otherwise collapse. We end with a comparison of our results with
the dynamics observed in colonies of the ant species Pristomyrmex punctatus
and in those of the Cape honeybee Apis mellifera capensis, and argue that they
qualitatively agree.
Abstract
1 Introduction
Public goods dilemmas occur when an individual must choose whether or not
to contribute to a commonly available (public) good [2, 15, 18, 25, 27, 40]. Con-
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tributing benefits the population by increasing the total amount of the public
good, but it comes at a cost to the individual (through energy expenditure, for
example), whereas choosing not to contribute comes at no cost to the individ-
ual, who still shares in benefits from the public good. Thus individuals must
choose between what is best for themselves and what is best for the popula-
tion, and in the basic public goods game, benefitting without contributing is
strictly speaking always the better choice [2, 27]. Consequently, the dilemma
inherent in public goods games have been used as a framework for studying the
origin of cooperation and other group interactions [2, 21]. Such dilemmas are
most naturally found in biological systems involving populations living closely
enough together so that individual efforts are inevitably shared, for instance
in bacterial species [9] such as Escherichia coli [39] and Myxococcus xanthus
[38], in social insects such as ants [12] and bees [22], and even in tumor cells,
in which a subpopulation of cells produce an insulin-like tumor growth factor
[1, 16]. While some such systems manage to persist in the presence of parasitic
cheaters (e.g., the queenless ant species Pristomyrmex punctatus, [12]), others
collapse (e.g., the Cape honey bee [22]), leading to the natural question of what
mechanisms foster these two outcomes. Many such mechanisms for sustaining
cooperation have been studied, most notably rewarding cooperation [33] and
punishing defection [15, 29], or through interspecies competition: competition
with a common opponent can stabilize cooperation within a public goods game
within microbial species [6]. None of these have been observed in either of the
previously mentioned ant or bee systems [13, 22], indicating that there are still
unexplored mechanisms by which cooperation can be sustained.
Our focus is on species that reproduce via parthenogenesis and occupy two
or more discrete regions, such as nests or colonies, between which individuals are
free to migrate. Parthenogenesis is a form of asexual reproduction in which an
embryo develops into an organism without fertilization [23]. The inheritance of
behavioral phenotypes this makes possible allows for a simplification in model-
ing reproductive competition mathematically, since differences in fitness impact
survival directly. Moreover, parthenogenetic reproduction is common in nature,
and has been observed in species ranging from aphids [32], ants [12, 13, 35], and
bees [22] to zebra sharks [14] and Komodo dragons [41].
Migration often plays a large role in many species’ survival. Driven by inter-
nal or external stimuli, species as simple as bacteria [36] to complex organisms
such as fish [26], birds [34], and countless others depend on their collective abil-
ity to migrate to evade environmental or ecological stress. Mathematical models
for migration have expanded our understanding of the formation of spatial pat-
terns in bacteria [37], flocking behavior of birds [19], and nest-site selection in
honeybees [28]. Here, we connect the well-studied fields of public goods games
with such models of migratory dynamics to study migration as a mechanism to
stabilize cooperation.
For the remainder of this paper, we will call the individuals that cooperate
“workers,” those that do not “cheaters,” and the discrete regions they occupy
“colonies” or “nests.” To model the role that cheaters play in such populations,
we propose a mathematical model coupling within-colony population dynamics
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and between-colony migratory dynamics. While our model shows that cheaters
drive down the fitness of an individual colony, it also makes the unexpected
prediction that fast cheaters can actually stabilize a network of colonies by sav-
ing individual colonies from collapse. The remainder of this paper is organized
as follows: in the following section, we develop a system of ordinary differen-
tial equations modeling the population dynamics of workers and cheaters in a
network of N colonies, connected according to a given connectivity matrix B.
We then analyze the behavior of a single colony, to determine conditions under
which workers and cheaters can coexist. In Section 3, we begin our investigation
of the effects of migration by considering a two-colony network, between which
the worker and cheater populations are free to travel, and determine conditions
under which the two nest colony can be maintained, and conditions under which
it collapses into a single nest. Section 4 builds on the results and intuition of
the two-colony system to determine similar conditions under which an N -colony,
all-to-all connected network collapses. Finally, we consider N -colony networks
connected according to more complicated graph structures, and discuss the im-
plications of our results.
2 Model construction
In this section, we develop a model of within- and between-colony dynamics of
a parthenogenetically reproducing organism. We generally consider a collection
of N colonies, which we will hereafter refer to as a colony network, or simply
a network, in which individual colonies are connected according to connectivity
matrix B = [βij ]: colony i is directly connected to colony j if and only if βij 6= 0,
and βij > 0 defines a migration rate between the two colonies.
Within each colony, the population is comprised of two sub-populations:
workers, who contribute to the public good, and cheaters, who do not, the two
of which interact according to a variation of an ecological public goods game
[18, 40]. We denote by ui the population of workers and by vi population of
cheaters in nest i. Within this nest, the worker and cheater populations are
assumed to grow proportionate to their respective population sizes:
u˙i = uiFi(ui, vi)
v˙i = viGi(ui, vi),
where F and G are their respective fitnesses. We assume each population grows
according to the logistic model, and therefore
Fi(ui, vi) = f(ui, vi)− γi(ui + vi)− µu
Gi(ui, vi) = g(ui, vi)− γi(ui + vi)− µv,
(1)
where f and g denote the growth rates of ui and vi, respectively, µu, µv denote
the death rates, and γi defines the carrying capacity of colony i. In this way, γi
can be interpreted as the quality of the ith nest, with smaller γi corresponds to
a nest of higher quality.
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We further assume that the growth of each population (f , g) is proportional
to their respective payouts from a public goods game. If each worker contributes
c to the public good, then cui/(ui + vi) is available for each individual within
the nest on average [18]. We therefore define
f(ui, vi) =
rucui
ui + vi
− c,
and
g(ui, vi) =
rvcui
ui + vi
,
where ru and rv are the intrinsic growth rates of the workers and cheaters,
respectively. Combining these with System (1) produces the following fitness
functions:
Fi(ui, vi) =
rucui
ui + vi
− c− γi(ui + vi)− µu
Gi(ui, vi) =
rvcui
ui + vi
− γi(ui + vi)− µv,
and therefore the within-nest dynamics are governed by the system
u˙i = ui
[
rucui
ui + vi
− c− γi(ui + vi)− µu
]
v˙i = vi
[
rvcui
ui + vi
− γi(ui + vi)− µv
]
,
(2)
which is similar to the ecological public goods models found in [18, 40].
A shortcoming of this model is that it is undefined at the extinction state
(u∗i , v
∗
i ) = (0, 0), although bounded [11]. Because we are interested in the pos-
sibility of extinction, we remedy this by redefining the growth functions f and
g within the fitness functions Fi and Gi, respectively, as
f(ui, vi) =
rucui
ui + vi + 
− c,
and
g(ui, vi) =
rvcui
ui + vi + 
,
where 0 <  << 1. The parameter  can be thought of as a decay rate in
the public good, see Appendix 7.1. With this modification, the system for the
within-nest-i dynamics becomes
u˙i = ui
[
rucui
ui + vi + 
− c− γi(ui + vi)− µu
]
v˙i = vi
[
rvcui
ui + vi + 
− γi(ui + vi)− µv
]
.
(3)
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We now turn our attention to between-nest migration. In their most general
form, migratory dynamics can be included in our model as follows
u˙i = uiFi(ui, vi) +
N∑
j=1
αijHu(ui, vi, uj , vj)
v˙i = viGi(ui, vi) +
N∑
j=1
βijHv(ui, vi, uj , vj),
(4)
for i = 1 . . . N , where αij and βij denote the migration rates between nests i
and j of the workers and cheaters, respectively. The functions Hu and Hv define
the migration dynamics of the worker and cheaters, respectively. We assume
that individuals will prefer to move from nests of lower fitness to nests of higher
fitness, and we therefore choose the H functions so that individuals move in the
direction that maximizes fitness gain [5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 31]. Under this assumption,
and following [11] we define
Hu(ui, vi, uj , vj) = [Fi(ui, vi)− Fj(uj , vj)] δuij and
Hv(ui, vi, uj , vj) = [Gi(ui, vi)−Gj(uj , vj)] δvij ,
(5)
where
δuij =
{
uj , if Fi(ui, vi)− Fj(uj , vj) ≥ 0
ui, if Fi(ui, vi)− Fj(uj , vj) < 0
and
δvij =
{
vj , if Gi(ui, vi)−Gj(uj , vj) ≥ 0
vi, if Gi(ui, vi)−Gj(uj , vj) < 0.
The terms δuij and δvij guarantee that the migratory flux is proportional to
the population size within the nest of lower fitness; that is, the nest from which
individuals are emigrating [11]. Consequently, the system is nonsmooth along
the manifolds defined by Fi(ui, vi)−Fj(uj , vj) = 0 andGi(ui, vi)−Gj(uj , vj) = 0
(commonly referred to as “switching manifolds,” see, e.g., [17, 20]) for each pair
i 6= j. Though this lack of smoothness complicates the analysis in Sections 3
and 4, we are still able to extract important information concerning the stability
of a colony in specific cases, and use this information to analyze general cases.
2.1 Single colony population dynamics
In order to study the effects migratory dynamics have on networks of nests, we
must first understand the behavior of a single nest without any such dynamics,
System (3). Since we are considering a single nest, we suppress the subscripted
i’s in this section and denote the worker and cheater populations by u and v,
respectively.
Note that this system does not have the nonsmooth manifolds mentioned
above, and consequently standard analytical methods for continuous dynamical
systems can be applied. Before we consider this system in its entirety, we first
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examine the system in the absence of cheaters, to establish a condition that
guarantees the survival of the workers in a cheater-free nest:
u˙ = u [ruc− c− γu− µu] . (6)
Equation (6) is the standard logistic growth model with effective growth rate
ruc − (c + µu). The worker population will tend toward its carrying capacity
[ruc− (c+ µu)]/γ as long as ruc− (c+ µu) > 0, and will otherwise tend toward
extinction. We will consequently impose the condition ruc − (c + µu) > 0 in
Systems (3) and (4).
We now include the presence of cheaters in System (3). In the classic public
goods game, each individual is assumed to derive the same payout from the
public good; that is ru = rv [2, 18, 40]. Under this assumption, the asymptotic
behavior of the two populations is entirely determined by the difference in their
respective effective decay rates, specifically by the sign of µu + c − µv. If this
quantity is negative, the workers will outcompete the cheaters. If the quantity is
negative, the cheaters outcompete the workers, but because the workers are the
only population contributing to the public good, both populations necessarily
tend toward extinction. Biologically, the parameters ru and rv can be thought
of as the relative growth rate of populations u and v, respectively, when each
worker is contributing to the public good at rate c. It is reasonable, then, to
assume that ru 6= rv in general, as workers and cheaters are often phenotypically
distinct and therefore have potentially different rates of growth [13, 35]. Without
loss of generality, and for consistency with [13, 35], we will assume that ru <
rv. Reversing this inequality does not change any of the qualitative behaviors
described below, only the regions in parameter space in which they are observed.
System (3) supports four equilibria in the nonnegative quadrant: extinction
u∗0 = 0
v∗0 = 0,
(E0)
two equilibria which have only workers
u∗1 =
cru − (µu + c)− γ −
√
(cru − (µu + c)− γ)2 − 4γ(µu + c)
2γ
v∗1 = 0,
(E1)
and
u∗2 =
cru − (µu + c)− γ +
√
(cru − (µu + c)− γ)2 − 4γ(µu + c)
2γ
v∗2 = 0,
(E2)
and the coexistence equilibrium
u∗3 =
(µv − (µu + c))(ruµv − rv(µu + c) + γ(rv − ru))
cγ(rv − ru)2
v∗3 =
(ruµv − rv(µu + c))(c(rv − ru) + µu + c− µv)
cγ(rv − ru)2 − 
µv − (µu + c)
c(rv − ru) .
(E3)
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For  > 0 small, equilibria E1 and E2 can be approximated by
(u∗1, v
∗
1) =
(
µu + c
cru − (µu + c), 0
)
,
and
(u∗2, v
∗
2) =
(
cru − (µ+ c)
γ
− cru
cru − (µu + c), 0
)
.
These approximations simplify the stability calculations below, and make clear
that E1 is near the origin. Importantly, equilibrium point E0 is not singular in
system (3), and extinction is consequently both well defined and possible.
Standard linear stability analysis reveals that, as long as all parameters
are positive, the extinction equilibrium E0 is always stable, and therefore the
nest can always collapse if the initial worker population is sufficiently small.
Similarly, E1 is always unstable, either as a node or saddle point. The coexisting
equilibrium point E3 is stable if and only if
ruµv > rv(µu + c) and c(rv − ru) + (µu + c− µv) > 0. (7)
Interestingly, the stability of E3 does not depend on the nest-quality parameter
γ. This means that no matter how poor the quality of the nest might be, the
worker and cheater populations can coexist there, as long as condition (7) is
satisfied. Therefore, any nest collapse observed once migratory dynamics are
introduced will be entirely a consequence of the migration itself (see Sections
3 and 4). We will generally use the parameter values found in Table 1, which
satisfy (7), unless otherwise specified.
These steady states provide the first insight into the effect cheaters have on
a nest by allowing us to compare the total population before and after cheater
invasion. For simplicity, we consider the case when  = 0. The ratio ρ of the
total population size at steady state after invasion to the total population size
at steady state before invasion is
ρ =
u∗3 + v
∗
3
u∗1
=
ruµv − rv(µu + c)
(rv − ru)(cru − (µu + c)) .
Under stability condition (7), 0 < ρ < 1, and perhaps unsurprisingly, cheaters
necessarily harm the population by reducing its total sustainable size within the
nest. For the parameters in Table 1, ρ = 0.25, which means that the presence
of cheaters reduces the total population size by 75% in this case.
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Parameter Default
value
ru Growth rate of workers 5
rv Growth rate of cheaters 6
c Diffusivity of nutrient 1
γi Quality of nest i 1
µu Mortality rate of workers 2
µv Mortality rate of cheaters 3.7
βu Migration rate of workers varies
βv Migration rate of cheaters varies
Table 1: Parameters used in model (4) unless otherwise indicated.
Stability condition (7) can be interpreted as a “happy medium” of cheater
fitness when contrasted with the alternative conditions in Table 2. Rewriting the
conditions slightly to ease biological interpretation, the worker-only equilibrium
E2 is stable if and only if ru/(µu + c) > rv/µv and cru − (µu + c) > crv −
µv. In this case, the worker population is much more fit than the cheater
population in terms of relative growth rate. Likewise, if ru/(µu + c) < rv/µv
and cru + (µu + c) < crv − µv, the cheater population is much more fit than
the worker population. In this case, the cheaters outcompete the workers, and
consequently collapse the entire nest; that is, the extinction state E0 is the only
stable equilibrium.
c(rv − ru) + (µu + c− µv) > 0 c(rv − ru) + (µu + c− µv) < 0
E1 saddle E1 saddle
ruµv > rv(µu + c) E2 saddle E2 stable
E3 stable E3 saddle, v3 < 0
E1 unstable node
ruµv < rv(µu + c) E2 saddle Impossible
E3 saddle, v3 < 0
Table 2: Stability behavior of equilibria.
Because the extinction state E0 is always stable, the results summarized in
Table 2 indicate that system (3) is bistable as long as ruµv > rv(µu + c). In
this case, equilibrium E1 is a saddle point, the stable manifold of which acts
as a separatrix between extinction and persistence (Figure 1). If in addition
c(rv − ru) + (µu + c− µv) > 0 (that is, stability condition (7) is satisfied), then
the coexistence state E3 is stable. The separatrix is shown as the black curve
emanating from the E1 in Figure 1B. To the left of this curve, all solutions tend
to the extinction equilibrium; that is, if the worker population is sufficiently
small relative to the cheater population, the nest will collapse. To the right,
they tend toward the coexistence steady state (Figure 1A). Nests will therefore
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only collapse if the cheater population becomes sufficiently large relative to the
worker population.
u
0 0.5 1 1.5
v
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(A)
u ×10-3
0 1 2 3 4 5
v
×10-3
0
1
2
3
4
5
(B)
Figure 1: Within-nest dynamics, for parameters listed in Table 1: A. Sample
trajectories in the uv-plane. The red and green circles denote equilibrium points
E1 and E3, respectively, and the blue circles represent the starting position of
each solution. The thick black curve is the stable manifold of E1. To the
left of the curve both the worker and cheater populations eventually become
extinct, to the right, both populations approach E3 and consequently persist;
B. Equilibria E0 and E1. Zooming in on phase plane near the origin shows the
stable extinction state E1 (green circle) and the saddle point E1 (red circle).
The stable manifold emanating from E1 is acts as the separatrix between the
two stable equilibria E1 and E3.
3 Migration between two colonies
We begin our investigation of the effects of migration by considering a network
comprised of only two colonies, between which all individuals are free to migrate.
We assume that the migration rate from nest 1 to nest 2 is the same as the
migration rate from nest 2 to nest 1 for both populations; that is, α12 = α21 = βu
and β12 = β21 = βv. System (4) therefore takes the form
u˙1 = βuHu(u1, v1, u2, v2) + u1F1(u1, v1)
v˙1 = βvHv(u1, v1, u2, v2) + v1G1(u1, v1)
u˙2 = −βuHu(u1, v1, u2, v2) + u2F2(u2, v2)
v˙2 = −βvHv(u1, v1, u2, v2) + v2G2(u2, v2),
(8)
where the H, F , and G functions are as in system (4).
Both of the individual nests maintain the same four equilibria as in the one-
nest system (3). This implies that system (8) has at least sixteen equilibrium
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points, though most are of little interest. Of particular importance are the
extinction state T0 = (0, 0, 0, 0), the two states in which one nest collapses,
T1 = (u
∗
1, v
∗
1 , 0, 0) and T2 = (0, 0, u
∗
2, v
∗
2), and the state T
∗ = (u∗1, v
∗
1 , u
∗
2, v
∗
2).
Linear stability analysis verifies that the extinction state T0 is always stable and
that under condition (7), both T1 and T2 are also always stable. The system
is therefore generally multistable. Because a single surviving nest necessarily
tends to the within-nest coexisting state E3, emphasis will now be shifted to
nest survival or collapse, instead of the composition of populations within each
nest. For the rest of this paper, we will therefore use the term coexisting state
to refer to T ∗ above, or the N -nest equivalent state.
We now seek to determine the effect migration has on nest persistence and
extinction. In general, both, one, or neither of the nests will collapse. In the
absence of migration (βu = βv = 0), the outcome of the two nests are indepen-
dent of one another, and the longterm behavior is determined by the analysis
presented in Section 2.1. With nonzero migration, even in the simple case in
which both nests are of equal quality, the system can show complicated depen-
dence on parameters. For example, Figure 2 shows the relationship between
initial conditions and nest collapse for fixed migration rates between identical
nests. Note that, unless vi(0) = 0 in both nests, there will be cheaters in both
nests for all t, so long as the nest does not collapse.
3.1 Colonies of equal quality
In general, the interior equilibrium T ∗ = (u∗1, v
∗
1 , u
∗
2, v
∗
2) falls along the nons-
mooth manifold, greatly complicating stability analysis [20]. However, in the
nongeneric case in which the two nests are of the same quality (γ1 = γ2 = γ),
we have u∗1 = u
∗
2 = u
∗ and v∗1 = v
∗
2 = v
∗, and the resulting symmetry about
each nonsmooth manifold reduces the question of stability to that of standard
linear stability analysis around this point. The four-dimensional linearized sys-
tem at this interior equilibrium has two complex pairs of eigenvalues: one pair
is independent of βu and βv and has negative real part as long as (7) is satisfied,
and the other pair has real part
σ =
1
2
(1 + 2βu)u
∗
(
rucv
∗
(u∗ + v∗)2
− γ
)
− 1
2
(1 + 2βv)v
∗
(
rvcu
∗
(u∗ + v∗)2
+ γ
)
. (9)
The interior equilibrium point undergoes a supercritical Hopf bifurcation when
σ changes from negative to positive. The left-most region (labeled “Stable co-
existence”) in Figure 3, corresponds to (βu, βv) pairs such that σ < 0 and T
∗ is
consequently asymptotically stable; that is, the two nests will generically main-
tain stable populations of coexisting workers and cheaters for motility rate pairs
taken from this region. As (βu, βv) values cross the dashed line, the equilibrium
undergoes a Hopf bifurcation and solutions tend to a stable periodic limit cy-
cle, in which workers and cheaters coexist in both nests for all time, but the
populations are constantly migrating back and forth between the nests. If βu is
further increased, the limit cycle loses its stability through what is numerically
determined to be a torus bifurcation. The solid blue line in Figure 3 denotes
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this line of torus bifurcations. For (βu, βv) pairs chosen from the region to the
right of the solid line, one nest necessarily collapses, leaving one nest in which
workers and cheaters coexist (at equilibrium E3, due to stability condition (7)).
Figure 2: Basins of attraction for single nest final states, as a function of initial
worker populations for two identical nests. The red region indicates the basin
of attraction of the nest 1-only coexisting steady state T1, and the blue region is
the basin of attraction of the nest 2-only coexisting steady state T2. The initial
conditions for cheaters are fixed at v1(0) = v2(0) = 0.1.
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u
0 0.5 1 1.5
β
v
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Stable coexistence
Nest collapse
Oscillations
Figure 3: Stability of the coexisting state (u∗1, v
∗
1 , u
∗
2, v
∗
2) over varied βu and
βv. The equilibrium is stable in region to the left of the dashed blue line. The
dashed blue line corresponds to σ = 0 and defines a line of supercritical Hopf
bifurcations: for parameter values chosen between the dashed line and the solid
line, trajectories are attracted to a stable periodic limit cycle. The limit cycle
undergoes a torus bifurcation when (βu, βv) passes through the solid blue line,
destroying the stability of the limit cycle. In this region, exactly one of the two
nests collapses. The points marked with shapes correspond to (βu, βv) pairs
considered in Figure 4.
Figure 4 shows the generic behaviors of System (8) for (βu, βv) pairs fixed
in each region in Figure 3. The cheater motility is fixed at βv = 0.2 in each
subfigure, and the system is initialized with both worker populations at their
cheater-free steady state values, u1(0) = u2(0) = 2, and a small perturbation
of cheaters are introduced into nest 1 only: v1(0) = 0.1, v2(0) = 0. In Figure
4A, worker motility is chosen as βu = 0.5, corresponding to the black circle in
Figure 3, and the solution tends to the coexisting steady state T ∗. Figure 4B
shows the solution curves with βu = 0.95, corresponding to the square in the
grey region of Figure 3. Both nests persist for all time, but their respective
worker and cheater populations oscillate in antiphase. Figures 4C and D both
show solution examples from the blue region in Figure 3. In 4C, βu = 1.1, and
nest 1 collapses while nest 2 tends to its coexisting steady state. In 4D, βu is
increased to 1.2, and now nest 2 collapses while both the workers and cheaters
persist in nest 1. This suggests that the system is very sensitive to changes in
motility rates, which we investigate below.
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Figure 4: Time series over varied βu with βv = 0.2 and initial conditions
u1(0) = 2, u2(0) = 2, v1(0) = 0.1, v2(0) = 0 fixed. A. βu = 0.5, correspond-
ing to the circle in Figure 3. The two nests both reach their interior equilibrium
point. B. βu = 0.95, corresponding to the square in Figure 3. The interior
equilibrium has undergone a Hopf bifurcation and the two worker and cheater
populations oscillate in anti-phase between the two nests. C. βu = 1.1, corre-
sponding to the upward facing triangle in Figure 3. The interior equilibrium
has lost stability completely through a torus bifurcation, and nest 1 collapses.
D. βu = 1.2, corresponding to the downward facing triangle in Figure 3. The
interior equilibrium is unstable, but now nest 2 collapses. Increasing βu further
with βv fixed will change which nest collapses.
The implications of Figures 3 and 4 are somewhat surprising: if workers
migrate too quickly to the nest with higher fitness, they cause the other nest to
collapse. Increased motility of these contributors therefore comes at a fairly high
cost. Increased motility of the cheaters, on the other hand, is strictly beneficial
in the sense of preservation of the network, even though the presence of cheaters
decreases the total population within each colony.
Figures 4C and D show that, in the parameter regime beyond the torus bi-
furcation, the nest that ultimately survives is highly dependent on the motility
rates of the two populations. This is verified by Figure 5: after the torus bifur-
cation, “bands” of survival appear, in which the two nests alternately survive
and collapse as the motilities vary (compare Figure 2).
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Figure 5: Basins of attraction across varied motility rates for two nests of equal
quality. Initial conditions are fixed at u1(0) = 2, v1(0) = 0.1, u2(0) = 2, v2(0) =
0. The color corresponds to the size of the worker population in nest 1 at time
t = 150; that is, the lighter the color, the larger the population in nest 1. The
dashed and solid lines correspond to the lines of Hopf and torus bifurcations,
respectively, as shown in Figure 3. To the left of the Hopf bifurcation, both nests
maintain a stable population of coexisting workers and cheaters. Between the
line of Hopf bifurcations and that of torus bifurcations, the individuals oscillate
between the two nests. To the right of the torus bifurcation, one of the two
nests necessary collapses: dark blue corresponds to nest 1 collapsing; light blue
corresponds to nest 2 collapsing.
3.2 Colonies of Unequal Quality
The above analysis only holds when considering colonies comprised of two nests
of equal quality (γ1 = γ2). When the quality of the nests is allowed to differ, the
question of stability is complicated by the loss of symmetry over the switching
manifolds. While there is an emerging theory on classifying the stability of
piecewise smooth systems (see, e.g., [17, 20]), the nonlinearity of the switching
manifolds in System (8) renders this analysis unfeasible. We instead explore the
behavior of such a system numerically. Figure 6A shows the basin of attraction
across varied βu, βv pairs when γ1 = 0.75 and γ2 = 1. The qualitative behavior
remains unchanged: for βu sufficiently small, the two nests persist with both
worker and cheater populations at their respective steady state values. As βu is
increased, the system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation, after which the populations
periodically migrate between the two nests. Continuing to increase βu causes
the periodic limit cycle to lose its stability, and one of the nests necessarily
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collapses. In this parameter region, the basins of attraction of the two nests
form “bands,” similar to the equal quality case (Figure 5). We conclude that
if the nests are similar enough in quality, their dynamics reflects that of the
equal-quality case.
If we allow the quality of the two nests to vary greatly, however, the lower
quality nest will typically collapse once the two-nest system becomes unstable.
Figure 6B shows the basins of attraction in the βu, βv plane when γ1 = 0.1 and
γ2 = 1. The system once again passes through through a Hopf bifurcation as βu
is increased through a critical threshold, and the resulting limit cycle still loses
stability through a torus bifurcation as βu increases further. However, in the
unstable parameter region, the higher quality nest (nest 1, in this case) almost
always survives, while the lower quality nest (nest 2) almost always collapses.
Interestingly, there is a small band of βu, βv pairs such that the lower quality
nest survives while the higher quality nest collapses, though that band disap-
pears as the discrepancy in quality grows even greater. We note here that this
behavior seems to generalize for colonies of larger size: if the discrepancy in
quality between each colony in a network is small, the system behaves similarly
to equal-quality case. If one or more nests are of significantly higher quality,
then those nests are considerably less likely to collapse once the coexisting state
of the colony network losing stability. Because of this seemingly general behav-
ior, we will only consider networks comprised of colonies of equal quality, and
not present any further results on the effects of unequal quality.
4 N colony system
We now consider a network of N colonies, with migration possible between any
two of them; that is, the network of nests is all-to-all connected. To do so, we
return to the 2N -equation system from Section 2
u˙i =
N∑
j=1
αijHu(ui, vi, uj , vj) + uiFi(ui, vi)
v˙i =
N∑
j=1
βijHv(uj , vj , u2, vj) + viGi(ui, vi),
(4)
for i = 1 . . . N . We will only consider the case in which αij = βu and βij = βv
for each 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N ; that is, all workers migrate at the same rate, as do
all cheaters. Just as in the two-nest case, we aim to study conditions that
generically lead to persistence or collapse. We only consider the symmetric case
in which γi = γj = γ for each 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , and consequently Fi = F and
Gi = G for each i. Under this assumption, we can again exploit the symmetry
of the system over each switching manifold, and apply linear stability analysis
to determine the structure of the coexisting state.
The Jacobian matrix of the N -nest coexisting equilibrium point is the 2N ×
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Figure 6: Basins of attraction over varied motility rates for two nests of unequal
quality. Initial conditions are fixed at u1(0) = 2, v1(0) = 0.1, u2(0) = 2, v2(0) =
0. The colors are the same as those in Figure 5. A. The quality of nest 1 is 50%
greater than that of nest 2: γ1 = 0.75 and γ2 = 1. The qualitative behavior of
the system over varied motility rates remains largely unchanged compared to
the equal nest quality case. B. The quality of nest 1 is ten times greater than
that of nest 2: γ1 = 0.1 and γ2 = 1. In the region to the right of the torus
bifurcation, the lower quality nest almost always is the one to collapse.
2N matrix
JN =

P + (N − 1)Q −Q −Q . . . −Q
−Q P + (N − 1)Q −Q . . . −Q
−Q −Q P + (N − 1)Q . . . −Q
...
...
...
. . .
...
−Q −Q −Q . . . P + (N − 1)Q
 ,
where
P =
[
∂F
∂u u
∗ ∂F
∂v u
∗
∂G
∂u v
∗ ∂G
∂v v
∗
]
,
and
Q =
[
βu
∂F
∂u u
∗ βu ∂F∂v u
∗
βv
∂G
∂u v
∗ βv ∂G∂v v
∗
]
.
The characteristic polynomial of JN can be shown to be
χJN (x) = χF (x) [χP+NQ(x)]
N−1
, (10)
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where χP (x) and χP+NQ(x) are the characteristic polynomials of P and P+NQ,
respectively. The stability of the coexisting state is therefore determined by the
eigenvalues of these two 2×2 matrices. The matrix P is the Jacobian matrix of
System (3) evaluated at the interior equilibrium point E3, and has eigenvalues
with negative real part as long as condition (7) is satisfied.
As long as the one-nest system is stable, then the stability of the N nest
system is determined by the matrix P + NQ. This matrix generally has a
complex pair of eigenvalues with real part
σN =
1
2
(1 +Nβu)u
∗
(
rucv
∗
(u∗ + v∗)2
− γ
)
− 1
2
(1 +Nβv)v
∗
(
rvcu
∗
(u∗ + v∗)2
+ γ
)
.
The N = 2 case was presented in Section 3 (Figure 3). For general N , when
βu = βv = 0, Q is the zero matrix, and the eigenvalues of P + NQ = P
consequently have negative real part. By continuity, σN must be negative for
βu and βv small. Increasing βu, however, will generically cause σN to become
positive, upon which the equilibrium goes through a Hopf bifurcation. The level
sets σN = 0 for N = 2, 3, and 4 are plotted as the dashed lines in Figure 7.
The solid lines following each line of Hopf bifurcations corresponds to a line of
torus bifurcations, found numerically, through which the colony network of size
N loses its stability. The behavior mimics that of the two-nest system: if worker
motility is small relative to cheater motility, the network is stable, but as workers
become faster, it begins to lose stability. As worker motility is increased, the
network collapses colony by colony until only a single one remains. Each level
set defines a line in the βu, βv plane, the slope m of which is independent of N .
As N → ∞, the line defined by σN = 0 converges to the line passing through
the origin with slope m, given by the green dashed line in Figure 7. Above and
to the left of this line, a colony network of any size can be supported.
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Figure 7: Hopf and torus bifurcations in colony networks of various sizes. For
each N , the dashed line corresponds to a line of Hopf bifurcations, defined
by σN = 0, and the solid line corresponds to a line of torus bifurcations, found
numerically. As worker motility is increased, the stability of each N -nest system
is lost, causing a single nest to collapse as the system undergoes each torus
bifurcation, until only a single nest remains.
For fixed βv, the stability of the N,N − 1, . . . , 2 nest systems are lost in
sequence through torus bifurcations as βu is increased. This suggests that for
fixed migration rates βu and βv, there is a maximum number of colonies that a
network can support. Figure 8 shows example trajectories of a four colony, all-
to-all connected system, in which each colony is of the same quality; βu is varied
while βv = 0.2 fixed. For small βu, the system supports stable equilibria within
each of the four nests (Figure 8B). As βu is increased, the four nest system
undergoes a Hopf bifurcation, and the individuals actively oscillate between
each of the four nests (Figure 8C). Increasing βu further causes the stability of
the four nest system to be completely lost, and one of the nests collapses (Figure
8D). From here, the network is effectively a three colony system, and increasing
βu causes the three remaining nests to similarly undergo a Hopf bifurcation,
after which the population within each nest oscillates (Figure 8E) and then a
torus bifurcation, after which another nest collapses, leaving only two active
nests (Figure 8F). The system is then identical to the two-nest system studied
in Section 3, which once again undergoes a Hopf bifurcation (Figure 8G), then
a torus bifurcation as βu is increased, resulting in only a single nest surviving
(Figure 8H). It is important to note that, much like in the two-nest system,
the nests that collapse are effectively random. This is in part due to the fact
that each nest in Figure 8 has the same carrying capacity and is connected
to each of the other three nests, though the simulations shown in Figure 6
suggest that even when the nests are of unequal quality, predicting which nests
will collapse is likely impossible. Moreover, the nests that ultimately collapse
for fixed βu and βv are determined entirely by initial conditions, and small
18
changes in initial conditions can result in entirely different subsets of an N -
colony network collapsing, further complicating any predictions (see Figure 2).
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Figure 8: Example trajectories after each bifurcation in a four-nest system. The
system was initialized by assigning ui = 0.35 + u and vi = 0.15 + v, where u
was selected at random from the interval [−0.1, 0.1] and v from [−0.06, 0.06].
For each simulation, βv = 0.2 was fixed, while βu was increased to a value past
the next successive bifurcation. In panels (B)-(H), the βu values used were,
respectively, 0.6, 0.66, 0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 0.96, and 1.0.
4.1 Dependence on network structure
The above results hold for all-to-all connected networks of nests. Of course, nests
in a natural setting are not necessarily arranged in such a way that movement
between any given pair is possible. We therefore now consider colonies connected
via more complicated network structures. While generalizing the above results
to a network with arbitrary structure is infeasible, we instead focus on two
simple networks that lend themselves to tractable analysis to provide evidence
that the stabilizing ability of fast cheaters appears to be network-independent.
We also briefly consider a network in which connections between colonies are
randomly generated. In each case considered, the qualitative behavior of the
system matches that of an all-to-all connected network: the coexisting state is
stable for small βu, but nests begin to collapse and the system begins to break
down as this motility is increased. Unlike the all-to-all connected cases, however,
a more general network structure can fragment into two or more independent
networks.
4.1.1 Two connected networks
We first consider two N -colony networks, both of which are connected all-to-
all, and are joined together by a single connection between one colony in each
network; the N = 4 case is shown in Figure 9A. In the symmetric case, in which
γi = γj for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2N , the Jacobian matrix of the interior equilibrium
point can be shown to have characteristic polynomial
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χJNN (x) = χP (x) [χP+NQ(x)]
2N−3
χP+λ1Q(x)χP+λ2Q(x),
where λ1 ≥ λ2 are the roots of the quadratic equation
λ2 − (N + 2)λ+ 2 = 0.
The first two distinct factors are the same as those that appear in the character-
istic polynomial (10) of the N -nest all-to-all connected system. The latter two
factors of χJNN (x) are the result of the modified network structure, and cor-
respond to the stability of the connection between the two colonies. Therefore
the stability of the coexisting state once again reduces finding the eigenvalues
of a 2 × 2 matrix. Just as in the all-to-all connected case above, for βu suffi-
ciently small, all eigenvalues of JNN have negative real part, and the network
is consequently stable. Because λ1 ≥ λ2, the eigenvalues of P + λ1Q are the
first to pass through the imaginary axis as βu increases, thereby disrupting the
overall stability of the network. Each eigenvalue corresponding to the stability
of the separate two N -nest all-to-all connected colonies has negative real part,
and conseqeuntly the instability must be in the connection between the two
colonies. Thus, for sufficiently large βu, one of the two colonies between which
the two networks are connected will collapse, and the system will fragment into
two independent networks, one of size N , the other of size N − 1 (Figure 9B).
The dynamics within these two networks then become those discussed in the
beginning of Section 4.
Figure 9: Dynamics of a colony network where two all-to-all sub-networks are
joined by a single connection: (A) network structure for a stable coexisting
equilibrium; (B) network structure after one of the two connecting colonies has
collapsed (see text).
The case when N = 4 is shown in Figure 10. For small βu, the system reaches
its coexisting steady state (Figure 10A), which undergoes a supercritical Hopf
bifurcation as βu increases through 0.584, then loses stability entirely through a
torus bifurcation at βu = 0.610. As predicted, after stability is lost, one of the
two nests through which the two colonies are connected collapses in each case
shown, resulting in two independent colonies (Figure 10B and C) comprised of
at most three and four nests, respectively, though fewer nests are possible if βu
is sufficiently large (Figure 10D). In Figure 10D, one of the colonies away from
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the connection in each network collapses before either of the connection-forming
colonies does, resulting briefly in two networks of three colonies being connected
by a single connection. The connection between the separate networks is still
unstable, however, and one of the two connecting nests will collapse, resulting
in two independent networks: one comprised of three colonies, the other of
two. This is worse than the theory predicts, since the three-colony all-to-all
connection network is still stable for βu = 0.7. The network structure therefore
led to one additional colony collapsing: three total colonies collapse, compared to
the two that theory predicts would collapse between two independent networks
of four colonies each with the same migration rates. In this way, the network
structure negatively impacts the stability of the network.
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Figure 10: Dynamics of two sub-networks of four colonies each, with βv = 0.2,
joined via single connection . A. βu = 0.55. The system reaches a coexisting
steady state in each nest. B. βu = 0.63. The coexisting steady state is unstable,
and the connecting colony in the second sub-network collapses, resulting in two
independent networks. C. βu = 0.65. The coexisting steady state is unstable,
and the connecting colony in the first network collapses. D. βu = 0.7. One
colony in the first sub-network collapses and two colonies in the second sub-
network collapse, resulting in two independent networks, one comprised of three
colonies, the other of two.
21
Figure 11: Loss of stability for a ring of six nests. A. The network before
stability is lost. B. The network after a single nest collapses. C and D. The
network after two non-adjacent nests collapse. The network shown in each panel
A-D corresponds to the final network structure in Figure 12 A-D, respectively.
4.1.2 Ring of colonies
As a second example of a tractable network configuration, we considerN colonies
connected in a ring. Much like each of the previously considered cases, a ring
of nests can support a stable population of coexisting workers and cheaters for
βu sufficiently small, and that stability is lost if βu becomes too large. De-
termining the stability for such a ring is straightforward in the case when N
is even. Curiously, the coexistence state in a ring of any even size undergoes
a Hopf bifurcation at the same critical value of βu; specifically when σN with
N = 4 passes through 0. The steady state then loses stability through a torus
bifurcation, much like every other case considered thus far. In the case when N
is odd, the analytic form of the eigenvalues is too cumbersome to provide any
insight, though numerical analysis suggests the coexistence steady state loses
stability in a qualitatively identical manner as when N even. After the ring
loses stability, the network will break into a line of N −1 colonies (Figure 11B),
and this line may then itself lose stability if βu is sufficiently large (Figure 11C
and D).
Examples of the population dynamics for the case N = 6 and βv = 0.2 are
shown in Figure 12. For sufficiently small βu, the network remains intact and
reaches its coexisting steady state (Figure 12A). As the worker motility rate in-
creases through βu = 0.658, the coexisting equilibrium undergoes a supercritical
Hopf bifurcation, and loses stability completely through a torus bifurcation as
βu is increased through 0.710. The behavior of the system after stability is lost
22
is highly dependent on both initial conditions and motility rates. Immediately
after stability is lost in this case, a single nest will collapse, resulting in a line of
five nests. This line-of-five-nests system approaches a stable limit cycle in Fig-
ure 12B, then loses its stability through a torus bifurcation at βu = 0.734, after
which another nest will necessarily collapse. Depending on which colony col-
lapses, the network of five colonies can be reduced to a network of four colonies,
and then to one network of three colonies and an independent, single colony
(Figure 12C), or to two independent networks of two colonies (Figure 12D). In
these various cases, the result is always that the initial network fragments into
pieces.
23
time
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
(A)workerscheaters
time
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
(B)
time
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
(C)
time
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
(D)
Figure 12: Dynamics of six nests arranged in a ring, with βv = 0.2. Vertical
dashed lines and color changes mark the collapse of a nest, and like-colored
curves represent populations within nests that belong to the same network. A.
βu = 0.6. The system reaches its coexisting steady state in each of the six
nests. The network structure is shown in Figure 11A. B. βu = 0.72. A single
nest collapses, resulting in a line of five nests oscillating over time, as shown
in Figure 11B. C. βu = 0.745. The line of five nests loses stability entirely,
and two nonadjacent nests collapse, resulting in two independent colonies: one
comprised of three nests, the other of a single nest (Figure 11C). The colony
consisting of three nests oscillates over time, while the single independent nest
reaches a stable steady state. D. βu = 0.75. Two nonadjacent nests collapse,
resulting in two independent colonies of two nests each (Figure 11D), both of
which reach a coexisting steady state.
These results, along with the analysis of two colonies joined via a single
connection in Section 4.1.1, suggest that the size of an interconnected colony is
limited by the motility rate of the workers, and independent of colony network
structure. To further study this conjecture, we consider a network of ten nests
connected at random (nest i connected to nest j with probability 0.5), and
determine the stability of the network at varying motility rates. Figure 13
illustrates how the colony breaks apart through nest collapse as βu is increased.
The upper network is the original, randomly connected starting condition in
this case study. The seven lower networks show the progression of nest collapse
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Figure 13: A network of ten randomly connected colonies, using a probability
of connection between each pair of 0.5. The initial conditions were generated
randomly as ui = 0.35 +u and vi = 0.15 +v, where u was selected at random
from the interval [−0.1, 0.1] and v from [−0.06, 0.06]. For small βu, the colony
network is stable, but as the parameter is increased, the network loses stability.
The figure shows the observed value of βu at which a colony collapses, and the
resulting configuration of the network. Black circles denote active colonies, and
red circles denote collapsed colonies.
over increased βu. As expected, for sufficiently small βu, the ten-nest as is
stable, but as the rate is increased past a critical threshold, one of the ten
nests collapses, leaving a nine-nest colony. This continues as βu is increased
until the colony collapses into three independent nests. While we only present
results from a single random realization, the qualitative behavior seems to be
consistent over repeated simulations (data not shown). Statistical analysis of
network-breakdown over a large number of simulations could prove useful in
understanding the role of motility in colony network collapse, which we leave as
an open question.
5 Discussion
We have introduced a model combining within-colony population dynamics and
between-colony migratory dynamics of a social organism that reproduces asexu-
ally. The population dynamics are rooted in a modified ecological public goods
game, not unlike those found in [40], in which workers provide a public good
that is freely available to every individual within the colony, while free-riding
cheaters do not produce any public good. The migratory dynamics are based
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on the assumption that the populations will always move toward a colony of
higher fitness than their current colony, or equivalently, away from colonies un-
der stress [11]. Analysis of our model indicates that, while cheaters can greatly
reduce the overall fitness of any nest they invade, their ability to migrate can act
as a stabilizing factor in a network of nests. In particular, if cheaters are suffi-
ciently fast relative to workers, the likelihood that any given nest will collapse is
reduced, thereby stabilizing the network. Importantly, our results suggest that
the cheaters must migrate at a sufficiently high rate relative to the workers. If
the workers are significantly faster than the cheaters, they will constantly be
moving away from the lowered fitness caused by cheaters, not allowing them-
selves time to establish a stable population within a nest. On the other hand,
if the cheaters are sufficiently fast, they spread and occupy each available nest,
removing any higher-fitness options from the workers. The workers are thereby
forced to stay in the cheater-occupied nest, having no better options to attract
them. In spatial ecology, this distribution in which individuals cannot increase
their fitness by moving to a different nest is called the ideal free distribution
[5, 7, 8].
Two examples of organisms whose social structures generally meet the as-
sumptions in our model are the queenless ant species Pristomyrmex punctatus
and the Cape honeybee Apis mellifera capensis. Populations of P. punctatus
found in central Japan maintain a subpopulation of genetic cheaters that con-
tribute nothing to the public good, in contrast with the productive workers, who
forage outside of the nest for food and tend to the young within the nest [12, 13].
The cheaters naturally add stress to the nest and workers in the form of increased
demand on public efforts, though colony collapse due to these cheaters has not
been observed [12]. Not surprisingly, these cheaters spread between colonies,
taking advantage of the free public goods while harming the overall fitness of
each colony [12, 35]. Of particular significance is the estimation that cheaters
tend to migrate between nests at a rate roughly three orders of magnitude faster
than their worker counterparts [13, 35]. In [12], the authors interpret this motil-
ity difference to indicate that cheaters might be able to abandon a nest before it
collapses due to their own presence. Our results agree with this hypothesis, and
further suggest that if the workers migrated at a rate similar to the cheaters,
then colonies would face collapse.
Cape honeybee workers behave as parasites themselves, invading nearby hon-
eybee colonies and acting as pseudoqueens, ultimately resulting in the loss of
the colony’s true queen and the collapse of the colony [24]. While no estimates
of Cape honeybee and their hosts’ migration rates seem to exist, it is certainly
reasonable to expect that these rates are faster than those of the previously dis-
cussed ants, as the bees fly instead of walk, are not impeded by geography, etc.
If so, the respective behaviors of these ants and bees agree qualitatively with our
model’s prediction: the cheaters in P. punctatus colonies migrate quickly rel-
ative to workers, and the populations manages to avoid colony collapse, while
our model would predict that the native worker honeybees migrate at a rate
closer to that of the cheaters, resulting in the observed colony collapse.
Our analysis predicts that one or more nests will collapse if the workers
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are too quick to migrate away from stress induced by cheaters; however, the
particular nests that collapse are highly sensitive to changes in motility rates
and initial conditions (Figures 5 and 2). This suggests that the dynamics of
the system might be changed significantly if we include in our model a small
stochastically varying migration term between each pair of connected nests.
Indeed, preliminary simulations suggest that allowing such random migration
in the worker population can stabilize the colony, preventing nest collapse in
an otherwise unstable parameter regime. Random migration in the cheater
population does not affect the qualitative dynamics, however. This suggests an
interesting trade off between two types of migration in the worker population:
the faster the workers move away from fitness-reducing stress, the more likely
a nest will collapse; however, faster random migration between nests can help
stabilize the colony. We leave this observation as a comment, and any questions
about the effects of random motility open. Such stabilization through stochastic
processes has been studied in, e.g., [3].
We mention in Section 3 that at least one nest must survive the collapse of
a network of nests. This is because the motility function in our model assumes
that individuals move only toward nests of higher fitness, and consequently
individuals cannot migrate if only a single nest remains. Future developments of
this model should therefore include between-nest dynamics, allowing individuals
to leave a nest without immediately entering another nest. This addition would
also allow one to consider the potentially important biological factor of the
cost of dispersal [4]. Additionally, future work should include the possibility of
a more dynamic network, as the merging of colonies has been observed in P.
punctatus [30]. While we contend that these omissions do not critically affect
our results, their inclusion could be useful in understanding related aspects of
migration, including optimal migration rates.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Slowly decaying public good
If we consider the public good available within a nest to be a dynamic variable,
say φ, then the within-nest dynamics of the workers and cheaters can take the
form
u˙ = u [r˜uφ− c− γ(u+ v)− µu]
v˙ = v [r˜vφ− γ(u+ v)− µv]
φ˙ = cu− [b(u+ v) + d]φ,
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where a is the production rate of the public good, b is the consumption rate by
both the workers and cheaters, and d is a natural decay rate. This decay rate
could biologically correspond to spoilage of food, for instance. If we assume the
public good reaches its steady state much more quickly than the workers and
cheaters, then we can replace φ with its steady state in the u and v equations:
u˙ = u
[
r˜u
cu
b(u+ v) + d
− c− γ(u+ v)− µu
]
v˙ = v
[
r˜v
cu
b(u+ v) + d
− γ(u+ v)− µv
]
.
Defining ru = r˜u/b, rv = r˜v/b, and  = d/b, we obtain system (3), and 0 <
 << 1 as long as 0 < d << b.
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